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AN ARGUMENT AGAINST 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACQUIESCENCE 
DREW A. SWANK* 
“They have made their decision, now let them enforce it.”1 




Administrative Law is different.  It is a code based system, normally 
without any role for legal precedent as found in the common law.  As such, 
when the decisions of an administrative agency are reviewed by a court, 
friction can result if the court creates a legal precedent which the agency 
does not follow, as it is not part of the agency’s rules or regulations.  This 
result is called non-acquiescence, where the administrative agency ignores 
the precedential value of a court’s ruling.  This Article suggests that, based 
on the Social Security Act and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, there are very few instances in which the Social Security 
Administration should alter its rules or regulations to accommodate a circuit 
court ruling.  Following a brief introduction, Part II of this Article describes 
the standard adjudication of a Social Security Disability Case to provide an 
example of administrative workings.  Next, Part III further articulates the 
problems created by non-acquiescence.  Finally, Parts IV and V discuss the 
impact of non-acquiescence from a policy and legal perspective. 
  
 
* Drew A. Swank is a graduate of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of 
William and Mary and is a member of the Virginia Bar.  The views expressed herein are those of 
the author and do not reflect those of the Social Security Administration nor the United States 
government.  Any errors and omissions are solely the responsibility of the author. 
1. President Jackson’s alleged response to Supreme Court’s decision in Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).  See generally Tim Alan Garrison, Worcester v. Georgia (1832), 
THE NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Apr. 27, 2004), http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge 
/Article.jsp?id=h-2720; Acquiescence, WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.websters-
online-dictionary.org/definitions/Acquiescence (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 1831, Samuel A. Worcester was convicted of violating a 
Georgia statute that made it illegal for a white person to reside on Cherokee 
lands without a state issued license.2  A missionary from Vermont living 
among the Cherokee, Worcester appealed his conviction all the way to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, arguing that Georgia’s law was both 
unconstitutional and contrary to federal law.3  The Supreme Court struck 
 
2. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 531-32. 
3. Id. at 534-35. 
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down the Georgia statute as unconstitutional.4  Because the United States 
was not a party to the suit, the Supreme Court did not order the federal 
government to enforce the decision.5  President Jackson – disagreeing with 
the decision in his ever-so-subtle manner – purportedly suggested that Chief 
Justice Marshall and the rest of the justices could enforce their decision 
themselves.6 
One hundred and eighty years later, some federal agencies continue to 
ignore the precedent set by federal circuit courts of appeals [hereafter 
circuit courts], in effect, invoking the sentiment attributed to President 
Jackson.  A variety of federal agencies, such as the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and Social 
Security Administration (SSA), issue decisions which are sometimes 
appealed to the circuit courts.7  There are times when the circuit courts 
determine how an agency’s regulations should be construed, which these 
agencies then choose to ignore in later opinions.8  This active refusal to 
follow the precedential value of a circuit court decision is termed non-
acquiescence.9  For decades, commentators and various courts have 
condemned these agencies for failing to modify their administrative 
regulations by acquiescing to circuit court precedent.10  The worst offender 
in this regard has been the SSA and its disability adjudication programs.11 
 
4. Id. at 561. 
5. Id. at 562-63. 
6. THE NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1. 
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006) (granting authority for some administrative decisions to be 
appealed). 
8. Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative 
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 681 (1989); see Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. 
Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1816 (1989). 
9. Robert J. Axelrod, Social Security:  The Politics of Nonacquiescence:  The Legacy of 
Stieberger v. Sullivan, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 765, 770-71 (1994) (“Non[-]acquiescence is the policy 
of refusing to follow the decision of a United States court of appeals except for the specific case 
decided by that court.”); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 681 (defining non-acquiescence as 
“[t]he selective refusal of administrative agencies to conduct their internal proceedings 
consistently with adverse rulings of the courts of appeals . . . .”); Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Social 
Security Administration Nonacquiescence:  The Need for Legislative Curbs on Agency Discretion, 
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 399, 401 (1989) (“[N]on[-]acquiescence is a comprehensive policy and 
practice of refusing to abide by judicial precedent.”); Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1816 (Non[-
]acquiescence is “the deliberate refusal of an administrative agency, exercising adjudicatory 
authority, to follow relevant judicial precedent in deciding another matter presenting the same 
question of law.”). 
10. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 681; see Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 400; 
Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1821. 
11. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 692.  See generally Kubitschek, supra note 9 
(discussing SSA’s failure to follow circuit courts’ precedent regarding the eligibility of injured 
and ill individuals for disability and supplemental income benefits); Ann Ruben, Note, Social 
Security Administration in Crisis:  Non-Acquiescence and Social Insecurity, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 
89, 98-103 (1986) (noting the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) refusal to 
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This Article, however, does not condemn every instance of the SSA’s 
decision to not follow the precedents set by a circuit court.  Instead, this 
Article argues the SSA should adopt a circuit court’s interpretations of the 
Agency’s rules or regulations only in an extremely narrow set of 
circumstances.  Otherwise, the SSA – while bound by any federal court’s 
decision in the particular case that the court heard – is under no obligation 
to follow any precedent set by the ruling unless issued by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.12  Even more fundamentally, this Article argues 
that due to the unique nature of the SSA’s adjudicatory scheme, the role of 
federal district and circuit courts need to be strictly confined to the role set 
forth by Congress and the Supreme Court when considering the SSA’s 
disability decisions. 
To accomplish these two goals, Part II of this Article describes the 
process by which a Social Security disability case progresses through the 
SSA’s administrative adjudicatory system to the federal courts.  
Furthermore, Part III describes the concept of acquiescence and the SSA’s 
current policy regarding when it will, and will not, follow the precedent set 
by a federal circuit court.  In Part IV, the Article then examines the 
controversy surrounding the concept of non-acquiescence and the harm that 
supposedly results.  Part V discusses the manner in which federal circuit 
courts are supposed to review federal administrative agency cases pursuant 
to the Supreme Court.  And finally, because of the fundamental differences 
of the SSA’s adjudicatory scheme, Part VI discusses how the federal courts’ 
role needs to be restricted when considering the Agency’s disability 
decisions. 
II. THE ADJUDICATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
CASES AND APPLICATION OF ACQUIESCENCE RULINGS 
Utilizing an example of a current administrative law issue that 
addresses acquiescence issues with federal and circuit courts can aid in 
understanding acquiescence.  One must first understand the process of 
initiating and appealing a social security disability claim.  Second, one 
should examine the acquiescence rulings currently impacting the Agency 
and its findings. 
 
follow the circuit courts’ medical improvement test, which prevents the Secretary from 
“terminating benefits without any showing of medical improvement”). 
12. Axelrod, supra note 9, at 770-71; Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 401. 
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A. NAVIGATING THE CURRENT SOCIAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
The current Social Security disability framework consists of initial and 
reconsideration determinations made at the state level.  Next is the 
opportunity to request a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge 
at the federal level.  The federal decision is reviewable upon appeal by the 
SSA’s Appeals Council and then subsequently by the federal courts. 
1. State Determinations 
In 2010, a record breaking 3,161,314 applications for disability benefits 
were filed with the SSA.13  This was more than a 230 percent increase over 
the number of applications filed only ten years before.14  The population of 
the United States only increased by nine percent during these same ten 
years.15  Further, no evidence exists indicating the number of disabilities in 
the United States increased at all during these same ten years, let alone grew 
by two hundred and thirty percent.  The increase in Social Security 
disability applications could be a result of either (1) a bad economy with 
record unemployment16 or (2) individuals’ desire to receive a lifetime’s 
worth of government disability benefits, rightfully or wrongly.17  Governed 
by Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act, the Agency has a four 
 
13. U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., No. 31-231, SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE AND FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, 3 (2011) [hereinafter U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN, SUMMARY 
OF PERFORMANCE]. 
14. U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., No. 13-11827, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 142 (2011) [hereinafter U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT] (reporting 1,364,323 disability applications were filed in the year 
2000). 
15. The population of the United States in the year 2000 was 281,421,906.  U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PHC-3, UNITED STATES SUMMARY:  2000:  POPULATION 
AND HOUSING AND UNIT COUNTS II-4 tbl.A (2004).  As of 2010, the population of the United 
States was 308,745,538.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION AND HOUSING OCCUPANCY 
STATUS:  2010, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid 
=DEC_10_NSRD_GCTPL2.US01PR&prodType=table. 
16. The SSA’s New Methods for Improving Disability Claim Backlog, VOCUS/PRWEB (Feb. 
2, 2011), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2011/2/prweb8104909 htm; Lisa Rein, Claims for 
Social Security Benefits on the Rise, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/claims_for_social_security_benefits_on_the_rise/2011/0
3/28/AFTPNgrB_story.html?wprss=rss_politics. 
17. Damian Paletta, Insolvency Looms as States Drain U.S. Disability Fund, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 22, 2011, at A1; Disability Payments:  The Elephant in the Waiting-Room, ECONOMIST 
(Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18332928?story_id=18332928.  Because the 
ultimate question in a Social Security disability decision is whether or not a disability prevents an 
individual from working, an individual’s inability to work because of the bad economy would be 
irrelevant to this determination.  See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A) (2006). 
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tier administrative adjudication scheme, using the same rules at each 
level.18 
The first tier of SSA’s adjudicatory scheme is an initial decision made 
by the claimant’s local Disability Determination Service operated by their 
state government.19  Of the new disability applications, approximately 
thirty-seven percent were approved at the initial level.20  Many of the 
remaining claims were appealed to the reconsideration level, which is also 
conducted by the state Disability Determination Service.21  Of these 
disability claims, an additional fourteen percent were approved.22  
Combined, almost half of all applications were paid through the first two 
levels of administrative review at the state level.23 
2. Federal Determinations 
In 2010, 720,161 claimants, whose claims had been denied at the initial 
and reconsideration levels, appealed their decisions to an administrative law 
judge at the federal level.24  Each of these claims had already been denied 
twice by the state level SSA Disability Determination Services using the 
exact same rules and regulations that the administrative law judges must 
follow.25  While hearings before administrative law judges are de novo, one 
would expect that many of these cases would be denied benefits based on 
the two previous denials, unless there is new evidence or a change in the 
claimant’s age that would trigger a regulatory requirement to award benefits 
 
18. See generally Drew A. Swank, Welfare, Income Detection, and the Shadow Economy, 8 
RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 614, 618-20 (2011) [hereinafter Swank, Welfare and Shadow 
Economy]. 
19. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1615, 416.1015 (2012). 
20. See Stephen Ohlemacher, Social Security Disability System Bogged Down with Requests, 
ONEIDA DAILY DISPATCH (May 9, 2010), http:/www.oneidadispatch.com/articles/2010/05/09/ 
news/doc4be763e82502259319203.prt. 
21. U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 146-47 tbl.61; 
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907, 416.1407 (2012). 
22. See Ohlemacher, supra note 20. 
23. Id.; see also Russell Grantham, Some Gains Made on Social Security Backlog, ATLANTA 
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.ajc.com/business/some-gains-made-on-
709806 html. 
24. U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE, supra note 13, at 3. 
25. Grantham, supra note 23.  The Social Security Administration did experiment in ten 
states having only a single review, and no reconsideration step at the state-level.  This experiment 
was a failure.  U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, NO. 02-322, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY, DISAPPOINTING RESULTS FROM SSA’S 
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESS WARRANT IMMEDIATE ATTENTION 3 
(2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02322.pdf. 
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as of a subsequent date.26  This is not the case.  In 2009, the SSA’s 
administrative law judges awarded benefits, on average, to sixty-three 
percent of twice denied cases.27  An explanation for this high approval rate 
is that the hearing before the administrative law judge is the first occasion 
where the claimant appears in person before an adjudicator.  However, if 
the decision is based on the longitudinal medical evidence as required by 
the regulations, the individual’s presence at a hearing should do nothing to 
change the results of their clinical examinations or diagnostic testing.28  In 
fiscal year 2010, approximately 128,703 of the remaining 266,460 denied 
claimants – forty-eight percent – requested review of the administrative law 
judge’s decision by the SSA’s Appeals Council.29  If there is no appeal of 
the administrative law judge’s decision, it becomes the final decision of the 
Agency.30  If the decision is appealed, the ruling of the Appeals Council 
becomes the final decision of the SSA.31 
3. Appealing the Decision in Federal Court 
If the claimant disagrees with this final decision issued by the Appeals 
Council, he or she may appeal it to the federal district court in which the 
claimant resides.32  The SSA is not allowed to appeal its own decisions to 
the district court.33  Rarely, however, does a case make it to federal district 
court.  In fiscal year 2010, there were only 12,257 cases filed by claimants 
in federal district court,34 less than one-half of one percent of all disability 
applications filed in 2009.35  While over twelve thousand cases may seem 
like a large number, 99.62% of all disability applications the Agency 
receives are not appealed to the federal district court.  The district court may 
affirm, reverse, or modify the Agency’s final decision with or without 
 
26. See generally Drew A. Swank, The Social Security Administration’s Condoning of and 
Colluding with Attorney Misconduct, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 507 (2012) [hereinafter Swank, Attorney 
Misconduct]. 
27. Ohlemacher, supra note 20. 
28. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 416.908 (2012); Disability Evaluation Under Social 
Security, Part II – Evidentiary Requirements, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., www.ssa.gov/disability/ 
professionals/bluebook/evidentiary.htm (last updated Feb. 09, 2011). 
29. General Appeals Council Statistics, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., www.ba.ssa.gov/appeals/ 
ac_statistics html (last updated Feb. 09, 2011) [hereinafter U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Appeal 
Statistics]. 
30. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955, 416.1455. 
31. Id. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006). 
33. Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 426. 
34. Civil Action Process, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., www.ssa.gov/appeals/court_process html 
(last updated Feb. 09, 2011). 
35. U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Appeal Statistics, supra note 29. 
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remanding the matter back to the Agency.36  Findings of fact by the Agency 
are to be reviewed by the federal district court under a “substantial 
evidence” test.37  As to issues of law, the federal district court’s review is 
limited by the Social Security Act to issues of whether the Agency’s 
adjudication of the claimant’s application for disability benefits conformed 
to the Agency’s regulations and their underlying construction.38 
Unlike the first four appeals, both the SSA and the claimant may 
appeal a district court decision to the circuit court.39  Both the Agency and 
claimant may likewise petition the Supreme Court to review a circuit court 
decision.40  The decisions of any federal court – whether district, circuit, or 
Supreme – is binding with regard to that particular claimant.41  Any ruling 
and accompanying precedent made by the Supreme Court is always binding 
on the SSA.42 
But what about the rulings made by the federal circuit court?  The 
SSA’s approach to circuit court decisions is set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 
404.985 and 416.1485.43  These regulations state that the SSA will apply a 
circuit court decision that the Agency determines conflicts with its own 
interpretation of either a provision of the Social Security Act or the 
Agency’s regulations at all applicable levels of the administrative review 
process within a particular circuit, unless the government seeks further 
judicial review or relitigates the issue in question.44  To apply a circuit 
court’s holding, the Agency will issue a Social Security Acquiescence 
Ruling.45  The Acquiescence Ruling will explain the court’s decision and 
how it will be applied in the administrative scheme.46  The Acquiescence 
Ruling will be effective upon publication in the Federal Register and remain 
in effect until rescinded.47  As with all Social Security regulations, only the 
 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 693. 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 693.  Substantial evidence is 
defined as more than a scintilla, but less than preponderance.  Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 217 (1938). 
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
39. Id.; Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 693. 
40. Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936. 
41. See Axelrod, supra note 9, at 770-71; Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 403; Schwartz, supra 
note 8, at 1816. 
42. Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 403. 
43. For an in-depth history of the Social Security Administration’s policies regarding non-
acquiescence, see Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 692-717; Kubitschek, supra note 9, 401-
08; Axelrod, supra note 9, at 770-81.  See generally Ruben, supra note 11; Schwartz, supra note 8. 
44. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.985(a), 416.1485(a) (2012). 
45. Id. §§ 404.985(b), 416.1485(b). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
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Commissioner48 may determine which circuit court cases will, and will not, 
be the subject of an Acquiescence Ruling.49  If the Commissioner does not 
issue an Acquiescence Ruling, the SSA limits the decision of a circuit court 
to the specific case it decides and will not apply any precedent from that 
case in the four levels of the administrative review process.50 
There are currently forty-three active Acquiescence Rulings for the 
eleven federal circuits.51  The numbers per circuit range from one for the 
First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits52 to ten for the Ninth Circuit.53  One of 
the cases that generated an Acquiescence Ruling is from the 1960s; two are 
from the 1970s, nineteen are from the 1980s, sixteen are from the 1990s, 
and five have arisen since the year 2000.54  The Agency can rescind an 
Acquiescence Ruling under certain circumstances, such as when the 
Supreme Court or the circuit court overrules or otherwise limits the 
precedential value of a decision, a new law is passed, or the Agency 
changes its regulations and the Agency determines that there is no longer a 
conflict between the court’s ruling and the Agency’s regulations.55  To date, 
there have been thirty-six Acquiescence Rulings that were subsequently 
rescinded.56 
 
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 902(A) (2006) (explaining the appointment, role, and powers of the 
Commissioner of Social Security). 
49. See, e.g., id. §§ 405(a); 1383(d)(1). 
The Commissioner of Social Security shall have full power and authority to make 
rules and regulations and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions 
of this title, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions, and shall 
adopt reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the 
nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing 
the same in order to establish the right to benefits hereunder. 
Id. § 405(a); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.985, 416.1485. 
50. See Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 401-02. 
51. Acquiescence Rulings Table of Contents, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/OP 
_Home/rulings/ar-toc html (last visited Apr. 17, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
Acquiescence Rulings]. 
52. Acquiescence Rulings First Circuit Court Table of Contents, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/ar/01/AR01toc html (last visited Apr. 17, 2012) 
[hereinafter U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., First Circuit Acquiescence Rulings]; Acquiescence Rulings 
Seventh Circuit Court Table of Contents, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/OP 
_Home/rulings/ar/07/AR07toc html (last visited Apr. 17, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., Seventh Acquiescence Rulings]; Acquiescence Rulings Tenth Circuit Court Table of 
Contents, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/ar/10/AR10toc html 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Tenth Circuit Acquiescence 
Rulings]. 
53. Acquiescence Rulings Ninth Circuit Court Table of Contents, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/ar/09/AR09toc html (last visited Apr. 17, 2012) 
[hereinafter U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Ninth Circuit Acquiescence Rulings]. 
54. U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Acquiescence Rulings, supra note 51. 
55. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.985(e), 416.1485(e) (2012). 
56. U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Acquiescence Rulings, supra note 51. 
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Inevitably, a claimant’s representative will argue in a Social Security 
disability hearing that the administrative law judge or Appeals Council 
must follow a federal district or circuit court precedent that is not the 
subject of an Acquiescence Ruling.  A Social Security administrative law 
judge’s authority is delegated to him or her by the Commissioner of Social 
Security.57  The administrative law judge is not an Article III judge,58 and 
he or she has no independent authority.59  The Commissioner cannot 
delegate to an administrative law judge a power that the Commissioner does 
not possess.60  An administrative law judge, whose only authority flows 
from the Commissioner, can neither override the Commissioner’s decision 
to follow or not follow a circuit court decision.  Unless there is an 
Acquiescence Ruling issued by the Commissioner, the administrative law 
judge or Appeals Council must ignore a federal district or circuit court 
precedent.61  In theory, the representatives who appear before 
administrative law judges in disability hearings are supposed to be 
competent and comply with the Agency’s rules and regulations – including 
knowing the regulations regarding Acquiescence Rulings.62  Likewise, an 
attorney is ethically prohibited from falsely representing controlling law.63  
An attorney representative who argues a Social Security administrative law 
judge must follow federal district or circuit court precedents, which the 
Commissioner chose not to make the subject of an Acquiescence Ruling, 
may fail to competently understand what authority is binding, behave 
unethically, or both.64 
 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 405(l) (2006). 
58. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
59. See Edward F. Lussier, The Role of the Article I “Trial Judge,” 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
775, 776 (1984). 
60. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATY ON GOVERNMENT, ch. XI (1690) (stating that “for no 
body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself . . . ”). 
61. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.985(e), 416.1485(e) (2012).  But see Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, 
at 689 (stating that Social Security staff may be instructed to ignore a federal circuit court 
decision, be given no guidance at all and therefore make their own determination, or merely be 
ignorant of the decision). 
62. See Drew A. Swank, Non-Attorney Social Security Disability Representatives and the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 223, 239-40 (2012) [hereinafter Swank, Non-
Attorney and Unauthorized Practice]. 
63. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2011).  “Legal argument 
based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal.”  Id. 
cmt. 4. 
64. Swank, Non-Attorney and Unauthorized Practice, supra note 62, at 228 (discussing how 
non-attorneys are not bound by state bar rules of professional ethics). 
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B. THE DILEMMA POSED BY SOCIAL SECURITY NON-ACQUIESCENCE 
It is this framework of how the SSA adjudicates its disability claims 
and selectively chooses which federal circuit case precedent to follow that 
has created the controversy surrounding non-acquiescence.  Selective non-
acquiescence has created the situation in which there are circuit court cases 
that the SSA follows and others that it does not.  While it is routinely 
condemned, the legality of non-acquiescence has not been determined.65  
Some commentators have concluded non-acquiescence is unconstitutional 
based on the doctrines of the separation of powers, due process, and equal 
protection.66  While criticized by some courts and legal scholars, non-
acquiescence has been seemingly tolerated by Congress and the Supreme 
Court in that neither has directly addressed the issue.67  Regardless of its 
legality, many individuals and organizations have been extremely critical of 
non-acquiescence, believing that in no circumstances should a federal 
agency be allowed to disregard the rulings of a federal court in that 
circuit.68 
III. THE ALLEGED HARM OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY NON-ACQUIESCENCE 
But what is the damage caused by Social Security non-acquiescence?  
Critics argue there are a variety of interrelated types of harm posed by the 
Agency ignoring circuit court precedent.  These harms include:  harm to the 
individual claimant, to the federal court system, to a society that is 
supposed to be governed by the rule of law, and even to the integrity of the 
Social Security disability program itself. 
A. IMPACT ON THE INDIVIDUAL CLAIMANT 
With regard to the individual claimant, when the SSA does not adopt 
every legal precedent set by a federal circuit court reviewing its decisions, 
two distinct bodies of law are created – the Agency’s administrative 
adjudication system and that of federal courts.  Claimants who under the 
Agency’s rules and regulations properly fail to qualify for disability 
benefits, but are persistent in appealing all four levels of the Agency’s 
 
65. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1823. 
66. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 718-19, see also Ruben, supra note 11, at 109; 
Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1827. 
67. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 681; see also Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 407; 
Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1821-23. 
68. Axelrod, supra note 9, at 771 n.30; see also The Federal Agency Compliance Act:  
Hearing Before the Sub. Comm. House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 66 (1999). 
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administrative adjudication system, may prevail under the different “rules” 
of the federal courts as determined by legal precedent.69  Critics maintain 
many of the claimants who appeal to federal court are successful once their 
claims are evaluated under the court’s legal precedents – although no 
statistics or success rate has been given to substantiate this claim.70  The 
critics further argue “[m]any poor, disabled individuals have lost claims – 
and consequently much needed social security disability benefits – which 
they would have won if they had appealed to the courts.”71 
Instead of making claimants appeal to the federal court, critics argue if 
only the SSA would acquiesce to the various federal circuit court decisions, 
then hundreds of thousands more deserving claimants would be paid their 
disability payments.72  By ignoring legal precedent through non-
acquiescence, the SSA is “a heartless and indifferent bureaucratic monster 
destroying the lives of disabled citizens and creating years of agony and 
anxiety . . . .”73  Critics further argue that the Agency rarely appeals circuit 
court decisions with which it disagrees to the Supreme Court, so as to not 
have a binding unfavorable precedent issued against.74  Merely ignoring the 
circuit court decision, these same critics assert, is much easier and safer 
from the Agency perspective so as to deny more claimants their properly 
deserved disability benefits.75  Such an approach hurts future claimants, 
because they cannot benefit from favorable court precedent, if the Agency 
will not follow it.76 
There is more at stake for the claimants, however, than money alone.  
Not only does the Agency deny these claimants their disability benefits, but 
it allegedly forces them to forego necessary medical treatment, which they 
cannot afford to do.77  It is further argued that even if the claimants 
persevere through the SSA adjudication process, finally receiving their 
overdue benefits hardly compensates them for the trauma they suffered at 
the hands of the SSA.78 
 
69. See Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 402-03, 412. 
70. Id. at 412. 
71. Id. at 400. 
72. Id. at 410-11. 
73. Id. at 410 (citing Merli v. Heckler, 600 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D.N.J. 1984)). 
74. Id. at 403. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 410. 
78. Id. at 410-11. 
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B. ALLEGED HARM TO THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM 
The claimant, however, is not the only entity supposedly harmed by the 
SSA’s intransigence.  Not only has non-acquiescence caused “a massive 
rise in the number of social security cases in federal court[s],”79 it has 
specifically led to an increase in complicated class action suits involving 
multiple claimants.80  Worse than the sheer number or types of lawsuits, 
some argue the SSA has unnecessarily burdened the courts with the “time-
consuming and unnecessary litigation” of deciding the same issue over and 
over merely because it refuses to follow court determined precedents.81  
Allegedly, scarce government litigation resources and taxpayer dollars 
would be saved by the SSA acquiescing to all circuit court decisions since it 
is claimed, without substantiation, that the claimant will undoubtedly 
prevail anyway once the federal court applies legal precedent.82  
Furthermore, the Agency’s belief that it “is entirely free to disregard 
binding law in the circuit”83 has supposedly damaged the relationship 
between the courts and the Agency, forcing the courts to scrutinize every 
Agency decision.84 
Ultimately, critics argue non-acquiescence violates the most 
fundamental tenet of judicial review as set forth over two hundred years ago 
by Marbury v. Madison85 – that the federal government’s agencies, like 
individuals, are bound to follow the law as interpreted by the courts.86  
Society as a whole is supposedly harmed by the Agency’s actions,87 for 
non-acquiescence ultimately “thwarts the intent of Congress and of the 
people whom Congress represents.”88  The whole rationale for federal 
administrative agency adjudication – of reducing the burden on the federal 
courts by impartially and fairly hearing claims89 – is negated by the 
 
79. Id. at 400; see also Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1818. 
80. Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 414; see Ruben, supra note 11, at 127. 
81. Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 412-13 (quoting Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 
65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1965)); Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1853.  Some also claim that 
due to SSA’s refusal to adhere to legal precedent, claimants appealing to federal court are forced 
to seek assistance from legal aid providers, thus reducing the amount of services these providers 
can provide to other individuals in need.  Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 416-17. 
82. Ruben, supra note 11, at 113. 
83. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 682. 
84. Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 413. 
85. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
86. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 700; see also Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1824; 
Ruben, supra note 11, at 110. 
87. Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 411-12. 
88. Id. at 412. 
89. Id. at 414; Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1853. 
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continued practice of non-acquiescence.90  The basic notion of separation of 
powers, with three equal branches of government, is undermined by 
executive agencies – such as the SSA – ignoring the role, and the decisions, 
of the courts.91 
C. POTENTIAL MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE AND OTHER 
 LEGAL INJUSTICES 
Perhaps most offensive of all to the legal profession, the SSA’s refusal 
to follow precedent violates the basic tenet of stare decisis.92  Stare decisis 
embodies the fundamental principle of common law that each judicial 
decision sets or follows a precedent to be applied in deciding similar cases 
arising within the same jurisdiction.93  It is this adherence to legal precedent 
that ensures the law is uniform, predictable, and impartial.94  By refusing to 
follow adverse legal precedent and using the same body of law throughout 
the administrative process, the SSA removes any notion of uniformity, 
predictability,95 and impartiality in its administrative adjudication system.96 
To be fair, non-acquiescence has historically had its defenders, or at 
least, it apologists.  They maintain that because the federal government is 
allowed to relitigate issues it had previously lost against a different 
claimant, as provided by United States v. Mendoza,97 non-acquiescence is a 
valid policy.98  Other arguments in support of Social Security non-
acquiescence include the need for uniformity of both decisions and the 
administration of the disability adjudication program nationwide,99 a desire 
not to overburden the Supreme Court with circuit court appeals,100 the 
Agency’s inability to appeal its own decisions to the district court,101 the 
concept of separation of powers between the executive administrative 
adjudication systems and the courts,102 the SSA’s statutory requirement “to 
 
90. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1816-17. 
91. Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 403-04; see also Ruben, supra note 11, at 109.  See 
generally Schwartz, supra note 8. 
92. Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 403-04; see Ruben, supra note 11, at 109-11.  See generally 
Schwartz, supra note 8. 
93. Ruben, supra note 11, at 111. 
94. Id. at 112-13. 
95. Id. at 113. 
96. Id. at 113-14. 
97. 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984). 
98. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 684; Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 417-18; see also 
Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1876. 
99. Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 427-32; Axelrod, supra note 9, at 772; see Schwartz, supra 
note 8, at 1818-19. 
100. Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 436-37. 
101. Id. at 426. 
102. Axelrod, supra note 9, at 771. 
          
2012] ADMINISTRATIVE ACQUIESCENCE 15 
interpret and establish rules pursuant to the Social Security Act,”103 and a 
desire to avoid the confusion of knowing which law to apply to which 
claimant.104 
IV. BINDING PRECEDENT ON FEDERAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS 
As previously discussed, critics attack non-acquiescence on a variety of 
fronts.  There are two ironies associated, however, with Social Security 
non-acquiescence.  The first is that it is in many instances the circuit courts, 
and not the Agency, that are not following the law.  The second is that if the 
circuit courts were to strictly follow the established law, then in very few 
instances would there even be a question of whether or not the SSA needs 
to acquiesce to a circuit court ruling.  When hearing a Social Security 
disability claim, there are only three questions a federal court should 
consider, whether:  (1) there was “substantial evidence” to support the 
Agency’s factual findings,105 (2) the Agency adjudicated the claimant’s 
application for disability benefits in accordance with the Agency’s 
regulations,106 and (3) those regulations are in accordance with the Social 
Security Act.107 
The answers to the first two questions remain purely factual; either the 
Agency had substantial evidence and followed its regulations, or it did not.  
No decision made by a circuit court with regard to these two questions 
would have any precedential value; rather, it would merely be case specific.  
Unless the circuit court felt an Agency mistake with regard to these two 
questions was merely harmless error, the court would be justified in 
overturning the Agency’s decision or remanding the case back to the 
Agency for correction.108  However, if the third scenario occurs, where the 
circuit court is faced with the question of whether the Agency’s 
interpretation of its regulations is correct, the United States Supreme Court 
has provided a framework to answer the question with its decision in 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council.109  In Chevron, the 
Supreme Court considered the construction of the Environmental Protection 
 
103. Id. 
104. Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 439. 
105. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 693.  Substantial 
evidence is defined as more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a 
preponderance.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (6th ed. 1992). 
106. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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Agency’s regulations in implementing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1977.110 
A. RELEVANT CASE LAW 
In upholding the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulations, the 
Supreme Court in Chevron and its subsequent progeny developed a two part 
test for a court to use when reviewing an agency’s construction of its 
regulations.111  First, the court must determine whether Congress “has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue” in the statutes on which the 
agency regulations are based.112  If it has, and congressional intent is clear, 
both the court and the agency must follow the “unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”113  There are two ways for a court to determine if 
Congress has done this.  The first is for the court to consider the plain 
language of the statute.114  The second is for the court to consider the 
legislative history of the statute to determine if it provides the necessary 
intent.115  If either the language of the statute or the legislative intent 
addresses how the regulations should be written, both the agency and the 
court are bound by it.116  If, however, the court concludes Congress has not 
directly addressed the precise question at issue either in the plain wording 
of the statute or in the legislative history of the statute’s enactment, it must 
determine if the agency’s construction of the statute is reasonable.117  This 
determination of the reasonableness of the agency’s construction is the 
second part of the test. 
In determining the reasonableness of the regulations, the court should 
defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as the construction is a 
reasonable policy choice.118  In making this determination, the court does 
not have to find that the agency’s interpretation is the only one possible, the 
best one possible, or necessarily the same interpretation as a court would 
have chosen.119  Rather, as long as Congress has delegated the authority to 
the agency to create regulations regarding the implementation of a statute, 
 
110. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839. 
111. Id. at 842-43. 
112. Id. at 842. 
113. Id. at 842-43 (citation omitted). 
114. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991).  See generally Ernest H. Schopler, 
Annotation, Supreme Court’s View as to Weight and Effect to be Given, on Subsequent Judicial 
Construction, to Prior Administrative Construction of Statute, 39 L. Ed. 2d 942 (1975). 
115. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
116. Rust, 500 U.S. at 184; see generally Schopler, supra note 114. 
117. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
118. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005); 
see also Rust, 500 U.S. at 173; Schopler, supra note 114. 
119. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11. 
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the agency’s regulations are to be “given controlling weight unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”120  Stated 
another way, as long as the agency’s regulations are neither arbitrary nor 
capricious, the court should not invalidate the regulations unless it appears 
from the statute or legislative history that the agency’s interpretation is not 
one that Congress would have sanctioned.121  What the court may not do, 
however, is “substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”122  
Ultimately, both the court’s review of the agency’s factual determinations 
under the “substantial evidence” standard, and the agency’s construction of 
its regulations, are deferential to the agency.123 
B. IMPACT OF CASE LAW 
For purposes of agency acquiescence, this framework offers a very 
narrow window in which the agency would ever have to adopt a court’s 
construction of its regulations.  It is axiomatic in jurisprudence that a court 
has to announce the rationale for its ruling, and not merely a verdict.124  
Only in those limited circumstances in which the court clearly announces as 
its holding that either, the plain meaning of the Social Security Act, or the 
clear intent of Congress requires that the SSA’s regulations must be 
constructed a certain way, would acquiescence even possibly apply; and 
then, only if the Agency decided not to appeal the matter to the Supreme 
Court.  If the holding of the court is not clear on this point, or if the Agency 
pursues the issue to the Supreme Court, there would be no need to 
acquiesce.  Furthermore, if the court through the Chevron analysis did not 
find either the plain meaning of the Social Security Act, or if the clear intent 
of Congress required that the Agency’s regulation be constructed in a 
certain way, but the court nevertheless disagreed with the Agency’s 
construction, the Agency would be under no obligation to adopt the court’s 
construction nor modify its own.125  While bound by the determination in 
that particular case at bar, there is no requirement to acquiesce and modify 
the Agency’s regulations unless the clear meaning of the statute or 
Congress’ intent is the basis for the court’s decision.  The Agency in this 
situation could consider modifying its regulations, but it would be under no 
 
120. Id. at 843-44; see also Axelrod, supra note 9, at 802. 
121. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845; see also Axelrod, supra note 9, at 802. 
122. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
123. Ruben, supra note 11, at 109. 
124. Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 558 U.S. 1, 1 (2009) (per curiam). 
125. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45. 
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legal obligation to do so.126  In this framework the burden is on the circuit 
court to announce its rationale for striking down the Agency’s construction 
of its regulations, making the issue very clear for the Supreme Court:  does 
the plain meaning of the statute, or the legislative intent, mandate that the 
Agency’s regulation on an issue must be constructed in a certain way?127  
Absent this level of specificity on the part of the circuit court, the Agency 
should be given the opportunity to administer the disability programs as 
entrusted by Congress.128 
V. CONCLUSION 
Currently, there are two distinct bodies of Social Security disability law 
– the first as envisioned by Congress and administered by the Agency; and 
the second, evolved from circuit court cases that federal courts are bound to 
follow, yet followed by the Agency only when it chooses.129  This dialectic 
has created a system whereby a disability claimant may properly be denied 
benefits under the rules and regulations promulgated by the SSA, and then 
prevail upon reaching the federal courts, which use a different body of 
governing law.130  Friction between the two systems is inevitable, not only 
with the two different bodies of law, but also because they are two separate 
approaches to jurisprudence – the Agency’s administrative inquisitorial, 
code based system, versus the court’s adversarial, common law approach.  
This friction increases when a federal court, applying its own law, remands 
a matter back to the SSA, which is incapable of applying the federal court’s 
law unless it is subject to Acquiescence Ruling.  The concept of non-
acquiescence, therefore, is the natural result of this conflict between two 
branches of government, applying two separate bodies of law with two 
separate systems of jurisprudence.131 
Conflict and frustration for the court, the Agency, and the disability 
claimant, is inevitable in such a paradigm.  The ultimate solution requires 
either the SSA change and acquiesce to every precedent set by a circuit 
court, or the courts change how they adjudicate the disability decisions of 
 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 842; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991); see also Schopler, supra note 
114. 
128. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45; see also Axelrod, supra note 9, at 802. 
129. Axelrod, supra note 9, at 770-71; Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 8, at 681; 
Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 401; Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1816. 
130. See Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 402-03, 412. 
131. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1826 (“The opportunity to engage in non[-]acquiescence 
arises when Congress grants adjudicatory authority to an administrative agency, while making the 
administrative decision subject to judicial review.  Non[-]acquiescence reflects a tension over the 
terms of the partnership in this shared exercise of federal adjudicatory authority.”). 
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the Agency.  Advocates of complete Agency acquiescence argue that the 
SSA’s acquiescence to adverse court precedent would have a minimal 
impact on the Agency, despite the need to run a uniform, nationwide 
program.132  The SSA, they maintain, fails to understand that the role of the 
judiciary, as it has evolved over eight centuries of common law, is to 
interpret the law and create binding legal precedent.133  It is this concept of 
stare decisis that provides the foundation for our common law,134 which the 
SSA threatens to destroy by non-acquiescing. 
What these advocates fail to appreciate, however, is that Congress 
could have designed an administrative disability adjudication system based 
on common law, in which circuit court case law is automatically applied.  
Congress, however, did not do so.  Instead, it created a code based system 
in which the SSA, and not the courts, was tasked with creating regulations 
to implement and administer the disability programs.135  It is because of the 
precedent set by the Supreme Court in Chevron and subsequent cases, the 
intent of Congress in creating the SSA, and the deference that is to be 
shown to the Agency, which requires that the courts change, not the 
Agency.  While it is entirely proper for the federal courts to review the 
SSA’s rules and policies “to ensure that they meet the requirements of the 
authorizing legislation and the Constitution,”136 that review should not 
exceed the framework set by Chevron. 
Ultimately, it is an issue of deference.  Congress’ intent was to create 
an Agency that the courts should defer to, and when a question arises as to 
how to interpret a statute, both the court and the Agency should defer to the 
intent of Congress.  The courts, however, have hijacked the process that 
Congress created with the court’s own interpretation of how it should be.  
As set forth by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), there are only three questions a federal 
court should consider when hearing a Social Security disability claim:  was 
there substantial evidence to support the Agency’s factual findings, did the 
agency follow its regulations, and is the Agency’s interpretation of the 
regulations consistent with what Congress intended?  The answer to the first 
two is simple and factual; either the Agency had substantial evidence and 
followed its regulations, or it did not.  If the circuit court is faced with the 
third question, then the Chevron framework applies.  By limiting judicial 
review to these three questions, the intent of Congress in creating the SSA 
is respected, the concept of judicial review is honored, and the separation of 
 
132. Ruben, supra note 11, at 113. 
133. Kubitschek, supra note 9, at 434. 
134. Ruben, supra note 11, at 111. 
135. See id. at 112. 
136. Id. at 108 (citation omitted). 
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powers between the branches of government – with the executive branch 
determining how its agencies will operate – is followed.  The concept of a 
uniform and fair nationwide disability adjudication system in which there is 
one set of rules applicable to all, is furthered by this limitation of the federal 
circuit court’s role. 
It is undisputed that the SSA’s disability programs have a myriad of 
problems – improperly paying disability benefits to individuals who are 
working,137 banning the reporting of attorney misconduct to state bars,138 
failing to regulate nonattorney representatives,139 paying disability claims 
merely to eliminate the backlog of cases,140 and many more that harm the 
truly disabled of America.  None of those problems or the myriad of others 
with the SSA are solved, however, by mandating the Agency follow every 
circuit court precedent – including those that are contrary to the Chevron 
analysis.  Instead, all that the court does in exceeding its role set by 
Chevron and the scope of judicial review set by the Social Security Act, is 
make the situation worse to the detriment to the Agency, the courts, the 
taxpayer, and most of all, the disabled. 
 
137. Swank, Welfare and Shadow Economy, supra note 18, at 632-33. 
138. Swank, Attorney Misconduct, supra note 26, 508-09. 
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